COORDINATING DRAFT

ANNEX B
RECOVERY FROM A CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACILITY INCIDENT

PRIMARY AGENCY: Washington State Department of Health

SUPPORT AGENCIES:
Washington State Department of Agriculture
Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife
Washington State Military Department
- Emergency Management Division
- National Guard

Washington State Patrol
Washington State Department of Transportation
Other State Agencies
Benton County

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of this Annex is to prescribe orderly and effective reentry and recovery to emergencies at the Umatilla Chemical Depot (UMCD). The principal objective of reentry is the controlled and temporary admission of emergency responders who can effect the reduction of the hazards to the level where unrestricted access and use of facilities, lands, and water are possible without risk to human health. Hazard reduction should occur in a phased manner with restricted access and use preceding unrestricted access and use. The objective of recovery includes measures needed to support the public until resumption of all normal activities in the area can commence, and the eventual return of conditions to their pre-disaster state.

B. Background

1. Reentry and recovery planning is an integral part of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). Originating in federal statute, the CSEPP has developed into a comprehensive program of improving the extent of plans and preparedness both for the chemical weapons disposal program, as well as for continued storage of the remaining portions of the stockpile. Proper planning for a release of agent from the stockpile must encompass preparation for the period following the implementation of immediate protective actions. This Plan describes the transition from immediate emergency response to reentry and recovery. It analyzes the legal framework that will govern reentry and recovery activities, and discusses the elements of reentry and restoration planning.

2. Although the dominant risk to the public early in a chemical accident is from inhalation, this risk changes after the release has terminated. While some types of agent disperse rapidly, environmental contamination by persistent agents potentially threatens the human ingestion pathway. Consequently, planning is required to implement the cleanup or other controls that may become necessary during a longer period after the immediate threat has ended.

3. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) was directed by Congress in December 1985, to destroy the U.S. stockpile of lethal unitary chemical weapons in such a manner as to provide maximum protection to the environment, the general public, and the personnel involved in the destruction; to provide adequate and safe facilities designed solely for the destruction of the stockpile; and to provide cleanup, dismantling, and disposal of the facilities on completion of the disposal program (Public Law 99-145, DOD Authorization Act of 1986).

C. Mission

1. The mission of the Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) is to assist the potentially impacted counties in planning for, and conducting reentry and recovery operations with federal and state organizations which will be working together on the following processes:

   a. Analyzing the extent of the contamination.

   b. Developing a plan to restore the affected area.

   c. Executing the plan.

   d. Monitoring the results.

2. The goal of reentry and recovery is to return the affected area to a level that is technically achievable as well as socially and politically acceptable. The most important consideration in achieving the goal is protecting public health and safety.

3. This Annex will provide local emergency management personnel with operational guidance to effectively manage recovery activities in the aftermath of a chemical event if agent escapes the UMCD boundaries. The purpose of this Annex is to provide a concept of operations for a coordinated reentry and recovery to a chemical event by defining roles and responsibilities of local and state agencies, and to define the linkages between local, state, and federal agencies.

D. Scope

1. Reentry begins during the later stages of the response activities, when the release has been stopped, but before cleanup of possibly contaminated areas has begun. Modeling and air sample monitoring will allow determination of an exclusion zone or wedge. Activities at this time will include:

    a. Assessing immediate emergency needs.

    b. Providing food, water, clothing, shelter, medical aid and supplies.

    c. Providing security.

    d. Caring for livestock and companion animals outside the exclusion wedge.

    e. Coordinating information and instruction to the public.

    f. Providing outreach efforts to ensure all victims have been identified and assisted, and inquiries for relatives have been handled.

2. Reentry will include short-term recovery efforts, as well as restoring the economic and social viability of the affected area. Activities will include:

    a. Conducting a detailed damage assessment to determine the need for, and the nature of, assistance required/desired.

    b. Implementing the sampling plan.

    c. Implementing the monitoring plan.

    d. Collecting, managing, and refining sampling data collected for use in assessing reentry issues.

    e. Continuing to assess public risk with emphasis on returning evacuees to their homes.

    f. Selecting cleanup criteria.

    g. Applying cleanup criteria.

    h. Coordinating reentry into evacuated areas.

i. Coordinating county, state, and federal disaster assistance of public entities and individuals.

j. Coordinating resources, materials, and volunteer organizations.

k. Coordinating information instructions to the public.

l. Identifying hazard mitigation opportunities.

m. Bringing citizens' interest groups into the planning process.

n. Restoring pubic infrastructure.

o. Addressing legal ramifications of recovery efforts.

p. Reaching consensus on what is technically achievable and legally acceptable concerning restoration.

q. Restoring the economic and social base of the area.

r. Making regular reports to the public.

3. Health and Safety aspects of Recovery

a. The safety policy of Washington State is to reduce and keep to a minimum, the chemical exposure and accidents to personnel, material, and monetary losses. This policy will enhance the capability to respond expeditiously and effectively to a reentry and recovery challenge.

b. Civic leaders, managers, and supervisors involved in reentry and recovery activities are responsible for conducting a program to recover from the disaster, reduce suffering, and restore lost and damaged property. This includes integrating safety factors and procedures into all operations, tasks, and training programs.

c. Each person must comply with safety and occupational health rules, regulations, and standards. In addition, each person will report any unsafe and unhealthy working conditions and accidents to their supervisor.

d. Compliance with heath and safety regulations requires that personnel involved in the reentry and recovery effort be covered by a health and safety program encompassing the following major points:

(1) Medical surveillance program.

(2) Emergency medical care and treatment.

(3) Health and safety training.

(4) Standard operating safety procedures.

(5) Site safety plan.

(6) Mental Health plans.

See Annex D, Health and Safety.

II. POLICIES

See the Basic Plan. Section II.

III. SITUATION

A. Site Background

1. Location and Topography

a. The UMCD is located in Umatilla and Morrow Counties in northeastern Oregon, near the south shore of the Columbia River, west of Hermiston, Oregon. The chemical limited area comprises Area K of the site. The approximate minimum distance from a chemical storage igloo to a depot boundary is 0.45 miles, which corresponds to the distance from any igloo in the northernmost row in Area K to the northern boundary of UMCD.

b. The terrain feature in the immediate area that would most significantly affect the dispersion of an accidental release is Coyote Coulee, a gulch running in a southwest-northeast direction in the northeastern corner of the installation. In the case of a small release, the gulch could tend to act as a barrier and channel the release in the direction of Umatilla. Should there be a large release, the resulting chemical cloud may bifurcate, in which case part of the cloud would move towards Umatilla and the other part towards Hermiston. The Columbia River is approximately three miles north of the storage area. The

river tends to channel the winds along its west-southwest/east-

northeast orientation. Under stable conditions, the Columbia River bluffs may act as a barrier and confine the cloud within the river valley. Should winds be perpendicular to the river, the cloud my follow creek canyons, which are also perpendicular to the river.

2. Climatology

a. The UMCD area has a dry continental climate, with a wide range of temperatures. Extreme temperatures above 100 degree Fahrenheit (F) and below 0 degree F usually occur a few times per year. Precipitation averages about 9 inches annually and generally results from winter cyclonic Pacific storms that have moved inland. Thunderstorms do occur during the dry summer season. Snowfall primarily occurs during the winter and averages about 9.4 inches annually.

b. Wind direction near the storage area is predominantly from the west-southwest, but frequently veers to the adjoining southwest and west directions. A secondary peak occurs from the east-northeast direction. These directions are aligned along the orientation of the Columbia River.

B. Umatilla Chemical Depot Hazard Inventory

1. By weight, approximately 12 percent of the national unitary chemical weapons stockpile are stored at UMCD. Quantities are listed in Table 1. The size of the inventory is important as it affects the probability of an agent release. However, the stockpile mix, or assortment of agent and munitions types at UMCD, are also important planning factors. The more heterogeneous the mix, the larger the variety of potential releases that could occur. The specific composition of the UMCD stockpile in terms of agent and munitions mix is shown in Table 2.

2. Of the agent/munitions combinations found at UMCD, the highest potential for a catastrophic release arises from ton containers of GB (Sarin), the chemical Isopropyl Methylphosphonofluoridate, and from M55 rockets of GB or VX, the chemical Phosphonothioic Acid. Ton containers of GB are potentially catastrophic because they have the required volume of agent, vulnerable physical mechanisms (valves and plugs), and agent volatility; ton containers of mustard or VX lack the volatility of GB. M55 rockets of GB or VX are potentially catastrophic because of

the propellant, flammable overpack, and dunnage associated with their storage.

a. Potential Effects on Water Supplies

The potential for chemical agent contamination of surface and ground waters is a concern. The Columbia River basin is the principal watershed near the UMCD. It flows in a westerly direction about three miles north of the UMCD boundary. In Oregon, the Umatilla River and Willow Creek, located approximately six miles east and 28 miles west of the installation, respectively, discharge into the Columbia River. It is used for both municipal and agricultural purposes and is a highly regarded recreational resource. The Columbia River forms the boundary between northern Oregon and southern Washington. A 23-mile stretch of river, from Juniper Canyon to the east and Crow Butte State Park to the west, known as the Marine Safety Zone (MSZ), is the responsibility of Benton County Emergency Management to monitor and evacuate in case of a chemical weapons release at the UMCD that might cause a hazard off post. See sketch map on page B–1–5, Annex B, Appendix l, Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Program, Emergency Planning Zones and Emergency Classifications. The most common methods of water resources contamination are:

(1) A direct spill of agent into surface waters.

(2) Airborne deposition onto surface waters.

(3) Runoff from heavy rains flowing over contaminated ground into surface water.

(4) Leaching of spilled agent into groundwater sources.

3. Potential effects on Agricultural Resources

a. The potential for chemical agent contamination of agricultural resources is a concern. Potential exists for contamination of drinking water, forage crops, grains, produce, and livestock as a consequence of persistent chemical warfare agent release. In addition, agricultural workers may be at risk from contact with dislogeable residue or from the inhalation of de-gassing chemical agent residue on crops.

b. In the unlikely event of an agent release being atmospherically transported outside the installation, food forage crops and structures will likely be suspect of

surface contamination. In cold and/or dry weather, sulfur mustard and VX would likely remain on vegetation. Meat or milk could thus become suspect from livestock ingestion, or contact with, contaminated forage or other materials. This is an especially problematic issue for persistent agents (VX and HD), which do not rapidly degrade and could pose a potential health concern for reentry.

c. Depending on the mode of release, direct effects on animals could result from inhalation, grooming of the pelt or skin, absorption through the skin, nose or eyes, and ingestion of contaminated vegetation or other food. Indirect effects could result from loss of bees and other insect pollinators as well as accessibility to food or forage for grazing species. Areas could also be closed to public use or areas remain unsuitable for crops or foraging, depending on the nature of the accident and the agent involved.

3. Agent Persistence

Agent persistence in soil depends on the soil characteristics, the type and amount of agent released, and the ambient air and soil temperatures. Temperature affects agent persistence. During cool weather or under winter conditions, droplets of mustard would likely remain where initially deposited for a time. Moreover, mustard agents do not readily dissolve in water, especially in bulk quantities deposited. However, because of the nature of the potential for release of the agent, such spills are unlikely to occur.

4. Behavior of Chemical Agents after an Accident

a. Following the release of chemical agents, dispersion, dilution, and degradation of the material will occur as it migrates and undergoes physical and chemical changes in the environment. This in turn will affect the ambiotic and biotic components of neighboring and perhaps distant ecosystems. The chemical agents under consideration include both persistent (including VX and mustard agent) and non-persistent materials (including GB). While the non-persistent agents will clear the area and disperse rapidly, persistent agents will remain for hours to days or longer, depending on weather conditions, unless removed by decontamination. Natural degradation and detoxification of chemical agents occurs in air, water, soil, and other media.

b. Natural processes may in some cases be very effective for the degradation of persistent agents. However, predicting the degree of reliance that it would be prudent to place on
such processes appears to be very complicated in the light of present knowledge. It appears then, that comprehensive monitoring and analytical controls remain for the present an essential requirement for ensuring that a formerly contaminated area is safe for unprotected personnel.

c. After the initial phases of the accident, the release of chemical agent will have been terminated, and escaped non-persistent agents will have for the most part dissipated. However, some persistent agents may remain in liquid form in scattered location for longer periods of time. The extent of this contamination will depend upon the type of agent, how the agent has been dispersed, quantities, and upon meteorological, topographic, and other conditions. The agent may penetrate some materials or some remaining agent may be transported in certain environmental media.

d. While concentrations of agent remain, there are potentially many pathways for exposure of human beings. Direct external exposure can continue as long-term exposure pathway after an accident if any localized concentrations of persistent agent remain in liquid form. If remaining concentrations of persistent chemical agents become vaporized, inhalation can again provide an exposure pathway. A release in which water supplies become contaminated can lead to drinking water as an exposure pathway. Internal exposure will also occur in humans if food, directly or indirectly contaminated, is ingested.

C. Impact of Agent Behavior on Reentry and Recovery Planning

When the early emergency response phase of the accident is over, the much longer period of time to assess the full impact of the accident by a detailed monitoring and sampling program, and longer term protective measures must be put in place. County emergency managers will need to provide for the needs of the evacuated population, both for a temporary period and as necessary, for long-term duration. Officials will make restrictions on access to the impacted areas and subsequently modify them based on results of monitoring studies. The reentry and recovery activities will begin simultaneous to the response activities of the emergency. It is very important to decision makers in their

deliberations that reentry and recovery, and implementing decisions be coordinated and integrated with response activities.

D. Planning Assumptions

1. An accidental release of chemical material from UMCD will occur.

2. The UMCD, state, and county emergency response procedures will provide for an effective and timely response to the emergency.

3. The state and UMCD will be required to provide assistance to the affected county(ies).

4. For a UMCD emergency, the 24 hour-a-day on-post Emergency Operations Center (EOC) will provide early warning to the adjacent counties and the Oregon and Washington States' EOCs.

5. The D2PC Gaussian Computer Dispersion Model used by CSEPP to measure the ingestion pathway of the release, or the plume, will be available to define the cloud's footprint and portray the boundaries of the hazardous concentration.

6. Monitoring capabilities will be provided to assist in determining the extent and the boundaries of the contamination.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General

1. Emergency management organizations of the state and federal governments and the affected facility will participate in the response, reentry, and recovery to chemical emergencies affecting Washington State. Agencies of each county within the plume and ingestion exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) of a facility will also participate. If a county is unable to respond to a facility emergency, the state will act in the interest of public health and safety of the residents.

2. Reentry and recovery for a CSEPP event will be managed, as any other hazardous material disaster, through the Recovery Resource Group (RRG); with the addition of the Service Response Force Commander (SRFC) as an integral member of the RRG. (Figure 1, Umatilla Recovery Resource Group). Appendix 3, Annex A, will be used to guide state agencies in recovery management.

B. Organization

1. The Department of Health (DOH) leads the state's technical

support to a fixed facility chemical emergency.

2. The overall state reentry and recovery effort for the emergency is coordinated from the RRG.

3. Each Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) county will provide a County Coordinating Officer (CCO) to the RRG. Elected county officials may also choose to participate in the RRG as members of that body.

4. The UMCD is expected to play a key role in the reentry and recovery operations. This will include such things as operating out of its own emergency facility, providing dose assessment assistance and field teams, and generally assisting the state(s) and affected counties with reentry and recovery operations.

5. The U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) can expect to be asked to send representatives to the RRG and the Disaster Field Office (DFO) to assist in coordinating reentry and recovery activities from the emergency.

V. TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO REENTRY AND RECOVERY (Also see Annex A, Recovery Activities and Responsibilities.)

A. Response Activities

1. Response actions are taken before or during a release of chemical material from a facility. Immediate emergency protective measures--sheltering and/or evacuation--are necessary to prevent or minimize direct exposure to chemical material. During the early phase of the emergency, the facility is responsible for making either automatic or other Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the affected counties and state(s). Plume exposure pathway EPZ counties are responsible for making Protective Action Decisions (PADs). Washington State provides support and professional health physics expertise to the counties.

2. DOH personnel will analyze the need for prompt PARs, identify the magnitude and location of a chemical plume in Washington State, project the dose to the public, and compare these projections with the Protective Action Guides (PAGs).

3. Upon notification of an alert or more severe emergency classification, DOH representatives, specifically trained in determining chemical doses and protective actions, will go to the appropriate facility's dose assessment center. Offsite dose

assessments will be performed jointly by UMCD or the Army and the state DOH, utilizing information from the facility and field data.

4. Chemical monitoring teams from UMCD and local resources will conduct initial chemical field monitoring. DOH, Washington State Departments of Ecology (Ecology) and Agriculture (WSDA) will also conduct offsite chemical monitoring to the limits of their capabilities.

B. Recovery Activities

1. The reentry and recovery phase begins when the chemical release has been contained and no further release of chemical material is anticipated. Reentry and recovery focus on minimizing exposure to chemical material deposited on the ground and preventing the consumption of contaminated food and water. During this phase, the RRG takes the lead in the consensus decision-making process, seeking expertise and participation from the affected counties.

2. Chemical monitoring resources available through the Army and other federal agencies are expected to become available when the Federal Emergency Response Task Force arrives.

3. The identification of Relocation Zones (RZs) and Food Control Areas (FCAs) is initially based upon field team data, computer projections, and calculated dose lines. As the response to the event unfolds, these areas are further refined through extensive field team sampling and laboratory analysis.

4. The affected counties recommend geopolitical boundaries for relocation and food control around the area identified by the dose assessment center. The details of the food control process are included in Annex E, Agriculture and Food Control Measures.

5. As the situation becomes clearer, the RRG begins to plan and implement the long-term activities necessary to restore the affected area to safe conditions. The state participates in this decision process through its Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) and uses the Reentry and Recovery Task Force (RRTF) to provide expertise, guidance, and recommendations--see *Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan* (CEMP), Emergency Support Function (ESF) 21, Recovery and Restoration, and Appendix l to Annex A of this Plan.

C. Response, Reentry, and Recovery Coordination System

1. The initial focus of local and federal agencies will be on safeguarding human life and containing the release. Maximum coordination among all agencies is imperative in order to ensure

an effective and expeditious response. Upon arriving at UMCD, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) must be able to expeditiously coordinate the use of federal response assets in conjunction with local and state agencies. This coordination will be affected through the formation and use of the Umatilla RRG depicted at Figure1. The group is organized as depicted in Part IV, B, Direction and Control; RRG, of the Basic Plan; and as further amplified below.

2. The Service Response Force Commander (SRFC) is the FOSC under the National Contingency Plan and has the responsibility of directing the federal response and coordinating with state and local community responders and leaders. An effective tool to discharge this responsibility is to develop a comprehensive coordination system that is tailored to the specific needs of responders at all levels of government. For the Umatilla community it involves the UMCD; Benton, Morrow, and Umatilla Counties; and Oregon and Washington States. The system must be simple and clear, yet comprehensive enough so that all jurisdictions and support agencies can fit together. The system must support response, reentry, and recovery because the reentry and recovery procedures will be implemented before emergency conditions subside, or the group is able to gather sufficient information to recommend transition to the recovery phase to decision-makers. The RRG has been identified as that group for the Umatilla chemical response area and parallels the RRG identified in the Basic Plan with the addition of the Service Response Force (SRF), the SRFC and the FOSC.

3. Coordination between the FOSC, the GARs, the County Coordinating Officers (CCOs), and UMCD Commander must begin early in the response effort and preferably before the FOSC arrives. The Deport Commander will arrange a conference call between the coordinators so they can begin to address the following:

   a. What will be done: planning, policy making, goals, etc.

   b. When is it to be done: priorities, scheduling, programming, etc.

   c. Who is to do it: organization, delegation of authority, division and coordination for work, functional relationships, etc.

   d. How it is to be done: systems, procedures, methods, standardization, etc.

   e. Availability of resources required to get it done: personnel,

supplies, funding, etc.

4. The coordination process will continue when the FOSC/SRFC and his staff arrive. All-around briefings will be provided with team building and mutual understanding of the situation as key objectives. The process of unity, partnership, and cooperation will be emphasized. Cohesion is essential for success and therefore the state and county representatives must instill in their organizations the necessity for a cohesive effort.

5. The UMCD Commander will make arrangements for the SRFC to meet with the Benton, Morrow, and Umatilla county Commissioners and to pay a call on Oregon and Washington States' Governors as soon as possible. The purpose of the visits is to emphasize the understanding that there will be a coordinated and comprehensive recovery effort based on plans that are tailored to the specific needs of the Umatilla community and its individual jurisdictions.

VI. RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Primary Agency:

Washington State Department of Health

DOH is responsible for planning and providing technical assistance for protection from chemical materials. This includes a 24-hour capability to determine the contamination received by emergency personnel involved in any chemical accident recovery effort, including volunteers. Location of appropriate monitoring and other specific DOH procedures are found in the Washington State DOH response procedures, and the Washington State Integrated Fixed Facility Radiological and Chemical Protection Plan, and Annex D, Health and Safety Considerations, to this Plan.

1. During the reentry and recovery phase, DOH assumes the lead and will coordinate and direct off-site monitoring to detect affected areas.

2. Develop, with WSDA, a prioritized sampling plan of the projected area(s) affected by a chemical release from the UMCD.

3. Contribute to the identification of the geopolitical boundaries of the relocation area(s) and FCAs.

4. Assign personnel to work cooperatively with WSDA personnel monitoring food at facilities within or near the FCAs, as

appropriate.

5. The State Health Officer is responsible for authorizing emergency workers to incur exposures in excess of those set forth in the PAGs in the DOH procedures.

6. The Drinking Water Division of DOH provides consultation on public drinking water sources. Actions could range from the conservation of water, to stopping the use of a source, to changing to a covered source. These activities will be closely coordinated with Ecology.

B. Support Agencies:

1. **Washington State Department of Agriculture**

WSDA is responsible for preventing the public from consuming adulterated food through oversight of commercial sales and movement of agricultural commodities within the contaminated or quarantined area. WSDA and DOH work in tandem to provide a comprehensive approach to the ingestion exposure pathway response.

a. Embargo all potentially adulterated food until it is shown to be safe by means of testing and analysis.

b. Assist DOH with obtaining samples for laboratory analysis at Food Access Control Points (FACPs), licensed dairies, farms, processing plants, and wholesale distributors, as requested.

c. Coordinate with county agricultural agents who are charged with identifying family and hobby farms in the ingestion pathway EPZ to ensure the operators are aware of the recommended protective actions.

d. Develop with DOH, a prioritized sampling plan of the projected area(s) affected by a chemical release from the UMCD.

e. Contribute to the identification of the geopolitical boundaries of the relocation area(s) and FCAs, and the locations for the FACPs.

f. Based upon data from DOH, issue embargo orders, oversee the testing of embargoed foods, and monitor the proper disposition of adulterated food.

2. **Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife**

a. Assist local governments with evacuation of the public from department lands and state fisheries jurisdictions, provide air transportation, law enforcement, and other support, as necessary.

b. When the Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) land holdings or facilities fall within the FCAs, department personnel will be assigned to work cooperatively with the other state agencies to conduct sampling, as well as control access into and out of these areas.

c. Work with the state EOC Executive Section to ensure the application of protective actions for fish and game in FCAs.

Table of Authorities: Chapter 77.12 RCW.

3. **Washington State Military Department**

a. Emergency Management Division will:

(1) Coordinate state agency activities from the state EOC during the response phase. During reentry and recovery, EMD facilitates the development of the state's PADs and coordinates the state's application of those decisions.

(2) Facilitate the state's adoption of the affected counties' recommended geopolitical boundaries identifying the FCAs and the relocation area(s), including identification of the best locations for Access Control Points (ACPs) and Traffic Control Points (TCPs). This decision-making process will include consultation with the state of Oregon, if necessary.

(3) In coordination with DOH, WSDA, Washington State Patrol (WSP), the state of Oregon, and adjacent state(s), confirm the staffing and equipment requirements for carrying out traffic control, security, and food control measures, for the relocation area(s), and FCAs, if required.

(4) At regular intervals, arrange for a full briefing of the state EOC Executive Section on the latest sampling and monitoring data, local jurisdiction decisions, and reentry, recovery and restoration

efforts.

(5) Develop estimates of the probable duration and scope of the response and recovery efforts based on consultation with the facility and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Share these estimates with the affected jurisdictions so all state and local jurisdictions can identify the staffing patterns necessary to accomplish shift changes, and resource requests requiring state or federal actions.

(6) Coordinate the dissemination of public information with the impacted counties at regular intervals.

b. National Guard

(1) Provide National Guard assistance, when approved.

(2) Provide transportation support (ground and air), as requested.

(3) Provide back-up mobile communications, as requested.

(5) Provide field logistical support as required in the following areas, as required:

(a) Mobile command posts.

(b) Temporary shelter (lodging).

(c) Mass feeding.

(d) Logistical support.

(e) Other resources, as required.

Table of Authorities: Chapter 38.52, and Sections 38.08.040, 38.08.060, 43.06.010, 43.06.270 RCW.

4. **Washington State Patrol**

a. Conduct traffic control, assist local law enforcement efforts, and coordinate the transportation of samples.

b. Provide supplemental enforcement services at the ACPs and TCPs with available resources.

c. Coordinate the provision of additional state law enforcement resources to local law enforcement agencies when requested. This includes the coordination of law enforcement resources with affected counties and the state of Oregon.

Table of Authorities: Sections 43.43.030 and 43.06.270 RCW.

5. **Washington State Department of Transportation**

a. Assist WSP, as requested, and coordinate with each affected county to perform traffic control and area access control.

b. Provide transportation and other logistical support, upon the request of the Director of the state EMD, to an affected county or other state agencies, on a noninterference basis with the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) primary activities.

Table of Authorities: Chapters 47.01, 47.48, 47.52 RCW.

6. **Other State Agencies**

a. The chief executives of other agencies will provide representation to the state EOC, as required. The responsibilities of the chief executive(s) of these other agencies may include the provision of personnel and resource support to responding agencies and assignment of public information personnel to support state emergency public information activities.

b. Each Washington State agency will provide a single point for coordinating requests for support, resources, and information exchange concerning emergency response and recovery activities. The authorities under which these other agencies will act are their respective Washington State statutes and Chapter 38.52 RCW. The procedures for these agencies support the Washington State CEMP.

7. **Benton County**

a. As the plume exposure pathway EPZ county, with the assistance of DOH and the state EMD, Benton County will manage the emergency and organize the county emergency management organizations.

b. The county needs to be prepared to arrange for transporting victims of chemical accidents to medical facilities.

c. The county will coordinate efforts of reentry and recovery task forces, response organizations, and volunteer groups to ensure optimum use of available resources

VII. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

A. Assessment Resources

Washington State will ensure availability of equipment, expertise, and facilities capable of providing methods for rapid assessment of actual or potential chemical hazards in magnitude and location.

B. Meteorological Information

Meteorological instrumentation at each facility will be used to provide state and county emergency responders with up-to-date weather information such as wind direction and speed, ambient temperature, and weather stability. In the event of a continuing emergency, the National Weather Service can supply meteorological analysis for the facility operator and responding federal, state, and county government agencies.

C. Laboratories

DOH's Public Health Laboratory is the designated Laboratory for Samples collected by Washington State field teams. Numerous federal, state, and facility laboratories are available throughout Washington and Oregon for chemical analysis.

D. Emergency Equipment and Supplies

1. DOH equipment and supplies are maintained and use according to DOH's *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Response Plan.*

2. The specifics of emergency equipment and supplies to be used in carrying out protective actions are addressed in Benton County's *Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and Procedures.*

E. Hospitals

1. Public and private hospitals in Washington State are capable of providing emergency and definitive care for chemical victims and

transportation arrangements of victims to these hospitals are contained in Benton County Emergency Response Procedures.

2. Primary (MS-1) hospitals performing these roles are Kadlec Medical Center in Richland, Kennewick General Hospital in Kennewick, Prosser Medical Hospital in Prosser, Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center in Pasco, and St. Mary Medical Center in Walla Walla.

F. Washington State Emergency Operations Center

1. The Washington State EOC is located at Camp Murray, Washington. The state EOC is a center where the Governor and appropriate state agency officials may assemble to coordinate, direct, and control protective actions related to the reentry and recovery operations, and direct state public information activities. Throughout this document, the state EOC is distinguished from each county EOC. Each county EOC is also utilized to coordinate the counties= (and related municipal) emergency response activities).

2. The state EOC will be activated by EMD upon notification from a facility operator of an Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), or General Emergency (GE). It is the responsibility of EMD to activate sufficient staff to maintain 24-hour operations of the state EOC, if required. The state EOC procedures are included in the *Washington State Emergency Operations Plan* (EOP), and EMD *Duty Officer Procedures.*

G. Emergency Worker/Assistance Centers

1. In the event of a release of chemical material, Benton County will establish Emergency Worker/Assistance Centers (EWACs) so all potentially contaminated emergency workers and the public can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary. These centers will be outside the 20-mile Primary Action Zone (PAZ) and will include showers, monitoring equipment, heating, and communications. The American Red Cross (ARC), or other volunteer groups will make sheltering and food available to evacuees. EWAC locations are listed in the county emergency response procedures and DOH procedures.

2. In some cases, EWACs located outside of Benton County will be activated by the host county and supported by the state. The American Red Cross will operate shelters. EWACs will be operated in accordance with the procedures contained in the affected county's emergency procedures.

3. DOH officials will ensure that chemical monitoring and decontamination for evacuees at all EWACs is provided, if necessary.

4. These EWACs may have to remain operational for extended periods of time during reentry and recovery operations until decontamination has been completed.

H. County Emergency Operations Centers

Each county within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, or host area of a facility will have provisions for a county EOC (Benton and Franklin Counties share an EOC). The locations and functions of each county EOC are detailed in each county's CEMP. Upon notification from the facility operator of an Alert, Site Area Emergency (SAE), or General Emergency (GE), the state EOC will designate a representative as a liaison to go to each county within the plume exposure EPZ of a facility experiencing an emergency.

I. Umatilla Chemical Depot Emergency Operations Center

UMCD will provide and equip an EOC from which to communicate with off site response centers and coordinate on site emergency actions.

J. Joint Information Center

A Joint Information Center (JIC) will be activated, from which the public information function will be coordinated. After notification by the operator of an Alert, SAE or GE, the state will send emergency public information personnel to the JIC. State public information coordination and dissemination activities are primarily conducted at the JIC. Federal agencies and the facility experiencing the emergency will coordinate all public information activities and news releases through this center.

K. Washington State Public Information System

In the event of a chemical incident, Washington State EMD will provide information regarding the incident, protective actions taken, and state emergency response and recovery activities. This will initially be done from the Washington Emergency Information Center (WEIC) at the state EOC, and then primarily through the JIC, as it becomes operational.

L. Washington State Interagency Communication System

1. The Washington State communication system is used to notify federal agencies, the state of Oregon, and each affected Washington State county of a chemical emergency. The dedicated telephone system connecting each facility with the

Washington State EOC and other appropriate EOCs are described in each facility's emergency response procedures. The communications capabilities of the Washington State EOC are described in the CEMP, ESF-2, Telecommunications/Information Systems and Warning.

2. In the event of an incident or emergency at UMCD, a 24-hour communications system is available at each county sheriff's office dispatch center. Local police departments and fire departments will communicate with the county emergency response units by two-way radio or by telephone.

M. County Public Notification and Information System

1. Benton County has established a public information and notification system to inform the public of the characteristics of Notification of a non-surety event, a post only emergency, or a community emergency, and to correct any erroneous information received by the public. This system is described in Benton County's Emergency Response Procedures and at Appendix 1 to this Annex. For notification of a non-surety event, the general public will be informed by press releases provided to the news media by the affected facility operator. For more severe emergency classifications, Benton County will instruct the public through its public notification system. This public notification system is capable of alerting people within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. It will also keep the public informed of reentry and recovery progress, exclusion zones, road closures, and other pertinent information.

2. The procedures for activating the public notification system are contained in Benton County’s Emergency Response Procedures. The notification systems that may be used are:

   a. Siren system.

   b. Emergency Alert System (EAS).

   c. Telephone automatic dialing system for emergency warning.

   d. Tone activated radio system.
   e. A combination of/or all of the above.

3. After notification and instruction by the county, residents will be expected to tune to a specific radio or television station. All identified stations have the capability of broadcasting 24-hours-a-day. Written instructions to be used in the public notification are contained in the county's emergency response procedures. If the

county is unable to activate its public notification system, the state will coordinate with the county to activate the state public notification and/or EAS. Details are included in the *Washington State Emergency Alert System Plan.*

VIII. REFERENCES

See the Basic Plan, Section II. A., Authorities, of the *Integrated Fixed Facility Radiological and Chemical Protection Plan.*